UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-30-2018

State v. Christian Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45692

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Christian Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45692" (2018). Not Reported. 4738.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4738

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
10/30/2018 1:01 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
NO. 45692
)
v.
)
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR-2017-5562
)
JONATHAN R. CHRISTIAN,
)
REPLY BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE GEORGE D. CAREY
HONORABLE THOMAS J. RYAN
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9855
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................ 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Exercise Reason
When Determining The Constitutionality Of His Alford Pleas ............................. 3
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Apply The
Correct Legal Standard To A Motion To Withdraw A Guilty Plea ....................... 5
III. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Christian’s
Motion To Withdraw Because He Presented A Just Reason For
Withdrawal ..................................................................................................... 7
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Jobe v. Dirne Clinic/Heritage Health, 163 Idaho 65 (2017).........................................................7
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)..............................................................................1
State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................................................... 6, 7
State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988) ........................................................................................7
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) ................................................................................. 3, 5
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481 (1993) ...........................................................................................3
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2007) ........................................................................4
State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428 (Ct. App. 1994) ........................................................................3
State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639 (Ct. App. 2016)........................................................................8
State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95 (2007) .........................................................................................3
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330 (Ct. App. 2009) ..................................................................... 3, 4, 6

Rules
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 ........................................................................................................... 3, 8

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonathan R. Christian asserts upon appeal that the district court abused its discretion by:
1) determining Mr. Christian’s plea was constitutionally sound; 2) applying an incorrect legal
standard at the motion to withdraw hearing; and 3) failing to find Mr. Christian had demonstrated
a “just reason” for withdrawing his Alford1 plea. In Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the
district court did not abuse its discretion when denying Mr. Christian’s motion to withdraw
because the court properly determined Mr. Christian’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, and since Mr. Christian did not set forth an entirely separate reason for withdrawal,
the district court was excused from applying the correct legal standard and proceeding to a “just
reason” analysis. (Resp. Br., p.14.) (“Here, however, the district court had no reason to proceed
past the first step because the only potential just reason that Christian chose to present the district
court was that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he did not take his
medication.”) The State also asserted Mr. Christian raised a “number of new reasons” which
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Resp. Br., p.10.)
Mr. Christian’s Reply is necessary to clarify the applicable legal standard and his
properly preserved arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Christian included a statement of the facts and course of proceedings in his
Appellant’s Brief, which he relies upon and incorporates herein. (Appellant’s Br., pp.1-7.) 2

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
In an effort to clarify any confusion with the record relating to counsel, Mr. Christian’s original
attorney remained as counsel of record throughout the proceedings, including at the plea hearing,
motion to withdraw evidentiary hearing, and sentencing hearing. A separate lawyer from
2

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Christian’s motion to withdraw his
Alford pleas?

counsel’s office appeared on the date that the parties advised the court Mr. Christian’s case
would be submitted to mediation. (R., generally.) See also Appellant’s Br., p.14.
2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Exercise Reason When Determining The
Constitutionality Of His Alford Pleas
Mr. Christian contends the district court erred at the motion to withdraw hearing by
determining his pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Idaho courts have clearly

delineated the applicable legal standard for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea – the first step is
to determine whether a plea meets constitutional standards and then determine if a defendant has
demonstrated a just reason for withdrawal. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 2009).
In order to satisfy constitutional muster, a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). Since fundamental rights are involved,
including the right against self-incrimination, the right to jury trial and the right to confrontation,
a “valid waiver will not be presumed but must be demonstrated by the record.” State v.
Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297 (1990). “Where a guilty plea is shown to be constitutionally
invalid . . . leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated.” State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho
428, 432 (Ct. App. 1994). Here, Mr. Christian tendered the issue as to the constitutionality of his
plea through his written Idaho Criminal Rule 33 (“Rule 33”) motion to withdraw his plea.
It follows then, upon this tender, a court is required to review the entire record to
ascertain the merits of his plea. See State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007) (reversing the
district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea after reviewing the record, and
determining the magistrate’s failure to fully advise defendant as to the child support obligation
resultant from his plea rendered his plea involuntary). Although the State contends Mr. Christian
raised a number of new issues on appeal that are disallowed pursuant to State v. Garcia-
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Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2007) and State v. Stone, 147 Idaho at 334-334, Mr. Christian
did not raise new and separate issues on appeal.
Rather, Mr. Christian cited to portions of the entire record that support the overarching
claim that he did make - that his plea was not valid. Mr. Christian provided multiple reasons for
withdrawal in his written motion – he asserted his plea was involuntary; he was not mentally able
to make an informed decision due to lack of pain medication; he had a lack of understanding as
to the gravity of his plea due to the stress of immense pain; he was not, without medication, able
to make an intelligent decision; and he did not understand that he was waiving a jury trial. See
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea) (R., pp.90-92.) At
the September 28, 2017, hearing, Mr. Christian presented evidence supporting his arguments: on
August 8, 2017, he was on medication; he did not get his medication that morning; he was in
“very tremendous pain” that day; he felt a lot of pressure due to his pain; he did not feel his
decision was clear and accurate; the medication he did receive that afternoon did not alleviate his
pain in time for the plea hearing; he didn’t remember whether he was asked by the judge whether
he needed more time; he was really upset and stressed out; he had a lot of emotions going on; he
had a lot of pressure to deal with at that time; and lastly, he was experiencing pain on August 2,
2017, which was within the days preceding the plea.

(Tr., pp.17-19; 27-34; 41.)

Thus,

Mr. Christian’s challenge to his plea was broad, encompassing a variety of arguments that all
relate to the ultimate issue as to whether his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
While Mr. Christian agrees with the State that he did not, during the motion to withdraw
hearing, verbally raise to the court’s attention the potential apparent conflict with counsel, or
emphasize the statements he made in court evidencing a lack of voluntariness, Mr. Christian
nonetheless tendered the issue by challenging the constitutionality of his plea as a whole, and
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these concerns were contained within the record for review.

And a challenge to the

constitutionality of a plea requires a reviewing court to ascertain its validity through a review of
the entire record. Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 300 (1990) (“A plea of guilty cannot stand unless the
record of the entire proceedings on appeal indicates that the plea was entered voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.”) The State presents no authority for the premise that upon a
challenge to the constitutionality of a plea, a court is excused from actually ensuring such plea
meets constitutional mandates.
As to Mr. Christian’s argument that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary,
Mr. Christian incorporates the arguments presented in his Appellant’s Brief. Mr. Christian
reiterates that the constitutionality of the plea must be inferred from the record as a whole, in
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The record in his case demonstrates several
factors, including Mr. Christian’s documented physical and mental deficits due to pain, the
apparent conflict with counsel, the timing of his mediation and plea, the insufficient questioning
at the time of his plea, his protestations of innocence, and his claims of memory lapse, all of
which served to undermine the integrity of his pleas such that the denial of his motion to
withdraw was unreasonable.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Apply The Correct Legal Standard To A
Motion To Withdraw A Guilty Plea
Mr. Christian contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply a “just
reason” analysis when considering the merits of his motion to withdraw his Alford pleas. The
applicable legal standard when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea
is to first determine whether a plea meets constitutional standards and then determine if a
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defendant can demonstrate a just reason for withdrawal. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208
P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding district court erred by failing to apply the “just reason”
standard, considering only whether the plea met constitutional standards). See State v. Anderson,
156 Idaho 230, 233 (Ct. App. 2014). Here, the district court engaged in the first step, but failed
to proceed to the second step.
There is no evidence in the record to support the court was aware of the requisite
analysis, or that it applied the same. The State’s argument that “there could be no second step in
the district court’s analysis because Christian did not even assert another ‘just reason for
withdrawing the plea’” is legally unsupported. (Resp. Br., p.14.) The State cites no valid
authority for the premise that a defendant must assert multiple and distinct reasons for each step
of the analysis, or that a court may ignore the “just reason” analysis when deciding a motion to
withdraw a plea brought prior to sentencing. In fact, the case of Anderson, 156 Idaho 230
(Ct. App. 2014), cited by the State ostensibly for this premise, is instructive.

There, the

defendant requested withdrawal of his guilty plea on the grounds that his anxiety, depression,
and family-related pressure, constituted a form of coercion, rendering his plea involuntary. Id. at
233. In the alternative, he asserted these grounds amounted to a “just reason.” The court
conducted a two-part analysis, determining first whether the plea was constitutional, and next,
determining whether he presented a “just reason.” Id. at 235 (“For similar reasons, Anderson has
also not shown that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the above factors
did not constitute other just reason for withdrawal of his plea.”).
Like Anderson, Mr. Christian asserted his plea was involuntary and that he had a “just
reason” for withdrawal of his plea, and like Anderson, his reasons were basically the same under
a constitutional analysis and a “just reason” analysis. Yet unlike the court in Anderson, the
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district court failed to conduct the second step of the analysis. When a district court applies an
incorrect legal standard, the decision must be vacated and the matter remanded for application of
the proper standard. Jobe v. Dirne Clinic/Heritage Health, 163 Idaho 65 (2017). As such,
Mr. Christian requests this Court vacate the order denying his motion to withdraw and remand.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Christian’s Motion To Withdraw
Because He Presented A Just Reason For Withdrawal
Mr. Christian presented strong and compelling evidence constituting a “just reason” to
withdraw his pleas. This “just reason standard does not require that the defendant establish
manifest injustice or a constitutional defect in the guilty plea. (citations omitted.) If he does so,
the State may avoid the granting of the motion by showing prejudice would result if the plea
were withdrawn.” Anderson, 156 Idaho at 233 (Ct. App. 2014). The Idaho Supreme Court has
determined the “threshold requirement of a just reason is not an onerous burden. It is a
reasonable requirement, to be administered liberally and with due recognition of the serious
consequences attending a guilty plea.” State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988). Mr. Christian
presented medical records and testimony indicating that he suffered real and severe pain from
sciatica on the day of the mediation and plea, and in the days preceding his plea, which, when
evaluated under this reasonable requirement, clearly satisfied the “just reason” standard. As
argued infra, Mr. Christian asserts the district court did not even apply this analysis.
However, even assuming the district court had assessed whether Mr. Christian presented
a just reason, it should have fully considered the medical records documenting Mr. Christian’s
injury and pain, the failure of the jail to provide him his medication on the morning of the
mediation and day of the plea, Mr. Christian’s testimony, the inability of Dr. Dawson to
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accurately opine as to Mr. Christian’s individual response to medication and level of pain given
the absence of treatment or consultation, and the inability of Dr. Dawson (a medical but not a
legal expert) to opine as to legal conclusions. Despite the good faith, credibility, and weight, of
Mr. Christian’s assertions, the district court failed to liberally exercise its discretion under Rule
33. See State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639 (Ct. App. 2016) (“Whether to grant a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such discretion should be
liberally applied.”). Moreover, the prosecution failed to present any evidence that the granting of
the motion to withdraw would prejudice the State.

As such, the district court abused its

discretion by determining Mr. Christian failed to demonstrate a just reason for withdrawal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, as augmented and clarified to any extent
necessary by this Reply Brief, Mr. Christian requests this Court to vacate the order denying his
motion to withdraw his Alford pleas, and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Lara E. Anderson
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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